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Abstract
The major results known for the marriage and university admissions problems | the one-to-one
and many-to-one stable matching problems | are shown to have equivalents in the general
many-to-many setting. Some of these results depend upon a particular, natural denition of indi-
vidual preferences over sets of mates: notably, characterizations of \optimal" stable assignments
in terms of \eciency", \monotonicity", and \strategy-proofness". ? 2000 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Think | if you will | of polyandrous polygamy or polygamous polyandry. Every
man may have several wives, every woman several husbands, and each person has a
strict preference order over those of the opposite sex deemed an acceptable partner.
The problem is to nd and analyze the structure of the stable matchings: those in
which no man and woman not matched can both improve their situations by being
matched. A less frivolous instance concerns medical graduates and hospitals of the
United Kingdom: medical graduates each seek two hospital positions, hospitals each
seek several interns [7].
Results known for the marriage or one-to-one stable matching problem (see e.g.,
[5,8,2,3]) and recently developed for the admissions or many-to-one stable matching
problem [4,1], all have their counterparts in the context of the more general problem.
In particular, if each player has a max{min preference over the set of opposite players
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with whom she or he is matched, then the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable
assignment mechanisms may each be uniquely characterized in terms of \eciency",
\monotonicity" and \strategy-proofness". Max{min individual preferences are mathe-
matically natural: they are, in fact, operative preferences when comparing stable as-
signments. In the context of marriage they are the usual ones; moreover, no weaker
individual preferences do the job.
The intent of this paper is to present these results succinctly.
2. Stable assignments
A many-to-many stable assignment problem or game ( ;p; q) is specied by a
directed graph   dened over a grid, and vectors of positive integers p; q, as follows.
There are two distinct, nite sets of players, R = fr1; r2; : : : ; rjRjg (the row-players,
\rows" or men) and C = fc1; c2; : : : ; cjCjg (the column-players, \columns" or women),
each player has a strict preference order over those players of the opposite set whom
she or he considers to be acceptable, and each has a quota on the total number of
players of the opposite set he or she may be assigned, pr for r 2 R and qc for
c 2 C. This data is modelled as a graph with nodes corresponding to pairs of mutually
acceptable players and arcs expressing the preferences. When qc = 1 for all c, this
is the university admissions problem with each c 2 C an \applicant", each r 2 R a
\university" with pr available slots. When pr=qc=1 for all r and c, this is the stable
marriage problem with each c 2 C a man, each r 2 R a woman.
Specically, the nodes of the graph   are the pairs (r; c), r 2 R and c 2 C, for
which r is acceptable to c and c to r. The fact that (r; c) 2   means that r prefers
to be matched to c than to be matched to fewer than pr column-players; and that c
prefers to be matched to r than to be matched to fewer than qc row-players. They
are taken to be located on the R C grid. The (directed) arcs of  , or ordered pairs
of nodes, are of two types: a horizontal arc ((r; ci); (r; cj)) expresses r’s preference
for cj over ci (sometimes written cj >r ci), symmetrically a vertical arc ((ri; c); (rj; c))
expresses applicant c’s preference for rj over ri (sometimes written rj >c ri). Fig. 1
gives an example of an assignment game (	;p; q). An arc such as ((r1; c4); (r2; c4))
expressing r2>c4 r1, implied by transitivity, is omitted. Throughout the paper arcs
implied by transitivity, are omitted. It is unambiguous to refer to the successors or
the predecessors of a node | or to say a node follows or precedes another | in its
row or column.
An assignment  in a game ( ;p; q) is a set of nodes of   at most pr in row r for
each r 2 R, and at most qc in column c for each c 2 C. An assignment  is stable if
(r; c) 62  implies that at least one of the two players r and c is better-o in : either r
is matched with pr column-players he prefers to c or c is matched with qc row-players
she prefers to r. In the contrary case (r; c) blocks : players r and c could agree to
be matched and thereby both improve their situations regardless of the other players.
In terms of graphs an assignment  is stable if for every node (r; c) either (r; c) is in
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Fig. 1. The game ( ; p; q).
Fig. 2. Row-domination: jDr j = pr
, or is followed by pr nodes of  in its row, or is followed by qc nodes of  in its
column.
A node (r; c) is row-best (column-best) if it has less than pr successors in its row
(less than qc successors in its column). If Dr is a set of pr column-best nodes in row
r and node (r; c) precedes them all, then (r; c) is row-dominated (by Dr) (as pictured
in Fig. 2, with Dr the black nodes); and symmetrically, if Dc is a set of qc row-best
nodes in column c and node (r; c) precedes them all, then (r; c) is column-dominated
(by Dc). It is immediately evident that if a node (r; c) is row- or column-dominated
then it can belong to no stable assignment.
Two assignment games are said to be equivalent if they admit precisely the same
set of stable assignments. The following lemmas are immediate (arguments given in
[2,3], or [1] are easily adapted).
Lemma 1. Suppose that the game ( ;p; q) contains a dominated node (r; c). Then
the game ( 0; p; q) obtained by deleting (r; c) and its adjacent arcs is equivalent to
( ;p; q).
Lemma 2. If ( ;p; q) contains no row-dominated (no column-dominated) node; then
the assignment C that assigns to each column-player c 2 C her preferred qc | or
all if fewer | row-players (the assignment R that assigns to each row-player r 2 R
his preferred pr | or all if fewer | column-players) is stable.
An assignment game ( ;p; q) that has no dominated node is called domination-free.
The domination-free equivalent of (	;p; q) is (	; p; q), given in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. The game ( ; p; q).
Lemma 3. The domination-free equivalent ( ; p; q) of an assignment game ( ;p; q)
is unique.
Theorem 1. Stable assignments exist in all assignment games.
Proof (The reduction algorithm). Given any assignment game ( ;p; q), eliminate any
dominated node (r; c) to obtain an equivalent assignment game ( 0; p; q). Repeat until
no further deletion is possible.
It is obvious that the algorithm terminates in a nite number of steps, which com-
pletes the proof. It may be shown that the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2), where
n=maxfjRj; jCjg.
3. The structure of stable assignments
Let (r) be the set of column-players assigned by  to row-player r | call them
r’s -mates | (and similarly dene c’s -mates (c)).
Theorem 2. If row-player r 2 R (column-player c 2 C) is assigned pr column-players
( qc row-players) in one stable assignment; then he is assigned pr (she is assigned qc)
in all stable assignments.
Proof. Suppose  and  are stable assignments that contradict the claim of the
theorem, j(r)j< j(r)j6pr . Then there must exist a node (r; c1) 2 n which,
by the stability of , must be followed in its column by qc1 nodes of . At least one
of these does not belong to , say (r1; c1) 2 n: so the fact of \entering" column
c1 means one may \leave" it. By the stability of , (r1; c1) must be followed in its
row by pr1 nodes of 
 and for at least one (r1; c2) 2 n: entering row r1 means
one may leave it. If a row other than r (or a column) is reentered, then one may leave
it by a dierent node of n (of n). The same is true for row r because of the
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hypothesis j(r)j< j(r)j6pr . Thus, nothing can stop this succession, an impossibil-
ity. The argument for column-players is symmetric.
Corollary. If pr <pr; or if the domination-free equivalent graph contains at most pr
nodes; then row-player r is assigned the same mates by all stable assignments (and
similarly for column-players c).
It is now obvious that by any reasonable denition of the preferences of the players,
R is the optimal stable assignment for the row-players: there exists no stable assign-
ment in which any one row-player is better-o (and similarly, C is the optimal stable
assignment for the column-players). But how \should" arbitrary stable assignments be
compared?
Theorem 3. Suppose  and  are stable assignments that assign dierent mates to
a row-player r. Then there is one (say ) such that
(r; c) 2  and (r; c) 2 n implies c>r c
and similarly for column-players.
Proof. (r) 6= (r) implies (in view of Theorem 2) that r has a least preferred
column-player c 2 (r) [ (r) that belongs to one set of mates and not the other,
say (r; c) 2 n. It must be followed in row r by some node (r; c) 2 n.
Suppose (r; c) is followed in row r by a node (r; c) 2 n. The stability of 
implies (r; c) is followed in its column by qc nodes of , of which at least one is not
in , say (r1; c) 2 n: entering column c means one may leave it. The stability of
 implies (r1; c) is followed in its row by pr1 nodes of 
, of which at least one is
not in , say (r1; c1) 2 n: entering row r1 means one may leave it. As in the proof
of Theorem 2, nothing may stop this sequence unless the initial row r is enterred at
a node (r; cs) 2 n: but, then, (r; cs) blocks , a contradiction. Therefore, in row r
every node of n must precede every node of n.
If a node (r; c) 2  \  precedes a node (r; c) 2 n an essentially identical
argument leads to contradicting ’s stability.
Let min((r)) be the least preferred column-player of r’s -mates (and min((c))
similarly). Theorem 3 immediately yields:
Corollary 1. If  and  are stable assignments of ( ;p; q) then for every r 2 R
either (r) = (r) or min((r)) 6= min((r)) (and similarly for every c 2 C).
It is therefore very easy for any one row- (or column)-player to compare his (her)
mates under any pair of stable assignments  and : either they are the same, or his
(her) least preferred mate in, say,  is better than his (her) least preferred in .
This naturally suggests that to compare sets of mates of arbitrary assignments 
and  (stable or not) individuals r 2 R (c 2 C) should use the max{min criterion,
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formally dened as follows:
>r if (r) = (r); or j(r)j>j(r)j and min((r))>r min((r)):
Take >r  to mean that >r and (r) 6= (r). And, of course, similarly dene
>c and >c. The relation >r (>c) is a complete order on the sets of mates row-player
r (column-player c) may be assigned by stable assignments. Applied to the marriage
problem this denition coincides with the usual one.
Now dene the collective partial order of the row-players R and the column players
C as follows:
>R if >rfor all r 2 R; and >C if >c for all c 2 C:
Take >R  to mean that >R and  6=  (and similarly for >C).
Corollary 2. Suppose  and  are stable assignments of ( ;p; q) that assign pr
mates to r and qc mates to c. >r 
 if and only if min((r))>r min((r)) and
>c  if and only if min((c))>cmin((c)). Row-player r may be assigned at
most nr − pr + 1 dierent sets of mates and column-player c at most nc − qc + 1;
over all stable assignments (where nr and nc are; respectively; the number of nodes
in row r and in column c of  ).
The interests of the row- and column-players are in direct opposition.
Lemma 4. If  and  are stable assignments of ( ;p; q) then >r  implies
<c  for all c 2 C for which (r; c) 2 (n) [ (n); and symmetrically.
Proof. If (r; c) 2 n, the stability of  implies (r; c) is followed by qc nodes of
, so  >c .
If (r; c) 2 n, suppose the statement false: a never ending sequence of nodes may
be constructed as in the proof of Theorem 2, a contradiction.
If  and  are stable assignments of some game, their supremum _ assigns to
each r 2 R the best of the two sets of mates (r) and (r); and their inmum ^
assigns to each r 2 R the worst of the two sets of mates (r) and (r).
Lemma 5. If  and  are stable assignments then so is their supremum  _ .
Proof. It must be shown that  _  is an assignment and that it is stable.
It has at most pr nodes in row r by denition. Suppose it had more than qc nodes in
some column c. Then there must exist nodes (r1; c); (r2; c) 2 _ with (r1; c) 2 n
and (r2; c) 2 n, where (say) r1>c r2. But (r1; c) 2 n implies (r1) 6= (r1),
and (r1; c) 2  _  that >r1 . Therefore, (r1; c) blocks , a contradiction.
So _ is an assignment. If it were not stable, some node (r; c) would block it, and
it is immediate to see that (r; c) must then block either  or , again a contradiction.
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Supremum and inmum | dened with respect to row-players | play the reverse
roles for the column-players.
Lemma 6. If  and  are stable assignments  _  assigns to each c the worst of
the two sets of mates (c) and (c).
Proof. All of the nodes of _  that are in any column c 2 C must belong either to
 or to : otherwise there are two nodes in _ , where (r; c) 2  and (r; c) 2 .
c prefers one to the other, say r >c r; but then (r; c) blocks , contradicting the
stability of . If  _  assigned the best of the two sets (c) and (c) to c | say
>c  | then any node of n blocks , again a contradiction.
Corollary. If  and  are stable assignments then so is their inmum  ^ ;
moreover; it assigns to each c the best of (c) and (c).
It is now easy to verify:
Theorem 4. The set of stable assignments of a game ( ;p; q); with the partial order
>R ; is a distributive lattice L( ;p; q).
4. Row- and column-optimal mechanisms
An assignment mechanism  is a function that selects exactly one stable assignment
for any assignment game. Two obvious examples are that which always selects the
row-optimal stable assignment R and that which always selects the column-optimal
stable assignment C (referred to, in deance of proper notation, as the row- and
column-optimal mechanisms R and C).
The mechanisms R and C are characterized in three dierent ways that directly
generalize characterizations given for the special case of the marriage problem (where
all quotas pr and qc are 1) and shows that the natural symmetry that exists between
men and women in the monogamous case extends to the polygamous=polyandrous
case. Thus the many-to-many problem may be viewed as equivalent to the one-to-one
problem. But the corresponding results for the many-to-one problem [1] have already
perplexed some experts since they seemed to contradict known facts [6], so, reader,
beware! What makes them true are the individual preferences of the players: each uses
the max{min criterion. This may, in some applications, be appropriate. But it is a
natural choice because it is, in fact, an operative criterion when a player compares
two sets of mates arising from two stable assignments (Theorem 3 or its Corollary 1).
The results are given for the mechanism R: symmetric statements hold for C .
Lemma 7. Let  be a stable assignment. Suppose the least preferred column-player
min((r)) of every r 2 R is not matched to some row-player r0 who prefers her to
one of his mates (r0). Then there exists a stable assignment  with  >R .
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Proof. For simplicity, let cr=min((r)) and =fcr : r 2 Rg. For each cr 2  there is
at least one r0 2 R not matched with cr who prefers cr to one of his mates (r0): let
r be the row-player in this set that cr prefers, and call  the set of nodes (r; cr).
By the stability of , every node of  is followed in its column by a node of . By
construction, every node of  is preceded in its row by a node of . Since jj= jj,
there exists (in  ) a directed cycle among a subset of nodes   [ .
Dene  to be  except for the nodes , where those of  are taken instead of
those of :
(r; c) 2  if (r; c) 2  [  or (r; c) 2 n:
 is clearly an assignment. It is also stable. For suppose (r; c) 62 . Then either
(r; c) 62  or (r; c) 2 n. In the rst case the fact that (r; c) is either followed in its
column by qc nodes of  or in its row by pr nodes of  carries over to . In the
second case, (r; c) = (r; cr) 2  [ , so by construction (r; c) is followed in its row by
pr nodes of .
A stable assignment  is row-ecient (column-ecient) if there exists no assign-
ment  (stable or not) for which >r  for every r 2 R (>c  for every c 2 C).
A preferable denition would replace >r for all r 2 R, with >r for all r 2 R and
 6=  (and similarly for the columns): but examples show the theorem that follows
would be false even in the case of the marriage problem.
Theorem 5. R is the unique row-ecient assignment mechanism.
Proof. It suces to show that R is row-ecient. So suppose not: there exists an
assignment >r R for all r 2 R.
If (r; c) 2 nR then, since >r R and R is stable, (r; c) must be followed in its
column by qc nodes of R. If (r; c) 2 Rn then (r0; c) 2 nR for some r0, otherwise
jj< jRj, contradicting >r R for all r 2 R.
Letting cr = min(R(r)), these two observations imply that every node (r; cr) must
be preceded in its column by a node (r; cr) 2 nR. But (r; cr) precedes (r; cr) in
row r since >r R, so the conditions of Lemma 7 hold, implying the existence of
a stable assignment  >R R, a contradiction that proves the theorem.
The example of Roth [7] (or an example in [1]) shows that if an individual preference
>r admits the possibility (r)>r (r) when min((r)) =r min((r)) then Theorem
5 is false, so the max{min preference is the weakest that may be invoked to assure its
truth.
Given the game ( ;p; q) and any subset R0R of the row-players, its restriction
to R0 is the game ( R0 ; pR0 ; q) where  R0 is the graph expressing the preferences on
R0  C and pR0 is the subvector of p corresponding to the rows R0. ( R0 ; pR0 ; q) is
the game that results if the row-players r 62 R0 withdraw from the original game. The
eect on the mechanism R is intuitively obvious.
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Lemma 8. If R0 is the row-optimal stable assignment of the restriction of ( ;p; q)
to R0; then R0>rR for r 2 R0.
Proof. Consider the game ( ;p; q) and successively eliminate any nodes (r; c) with r 2
R0 by sets Dc of row-best nodes that belong to R0. Continue until no node (r; c); r 2 R0
may be eliminated. Assign to each player r 2 R0 his preferred pr column-players: this
is the row-optimal stable assignment R0 . To obtain the row-optimal stable assignment
R of ( ;p; q) continue to eliminate all column-dominated nodes. Either none of the
nodes of R0 are eliminated, in which case R0 =r R; r 2 R0; or some are eliminated,
in which case R0 >r R for at least one r 2 R0.
The next lemma is the key fact needed in the sequel.
Lemma 9. If  is an assigment strictly preferred to R by every row-player r 2 R0R
but not by r 62 R0; then some (r; c) with r 62 R0 blocks .
Proof. In ( ;p; q); >r R for r 2 R0 but 6rR for r 62 R0. Let (  ;p; q) be the
game obtained from ( ;p; q) by eliminating all nodes that succeed (r; cr) in every
row r 2 R0, where cr = min(R(r)), except those that belong to  [ R. If  is a
stable assignment in ( ;p; q) then 6rR for all r 2 R, so the nodes of (r) either
precede (r; cr) or belong to R (by Theorem 3), implying that ( ;p; q) and (  ;p; q)
are equivalent.
For r 2 R0 any node (r; c) 2 nR is preceded in its row by at least one node of
Rn, so the stability of R implies that (r; c) is succeeded in column c by qc nodes
of R, the nodes corresponding to c’s mates R(c), at least one of which, say ( r; c), is
not in . If r 62 R0 then ( r; c) blocks , as was to be shown. So, suppose this situation
is never realized.
Let (  R0 ; pR0 ; q) be the restriction of (  ;p; q) to R0, and let R0 be its row-optimal
stable assignment. The hypothesis together with Theorem 5 and Lemma 8 shows that
it is impossible for R0 =r R for all r 2 R0, so R0 must contain a node of nR.
Take (  ;p; q) and successively eliminate nodes that are column-dominated, thereby
obtaining a sequence of equivalent games. At some step a node (r; c) 2 nR must be
column-dominated by a set Dc that includes a row-best node ( r; c) with r 62 R0 (as is
shown in the next paragraph). But then ( r; c) blocks , and establishes the lemma.
To see the truth of the above claim, suppose otherwise. Then every node (r; c) 2
nR is eliminated by dominating sets Dc that include only nodes (r; c) with r 2
R0. This means that the restrictions of the equivalent games of the sequence are all
equivalent as well, and the row-optimal stable assignment of the restriction of the nal
game is R0 . But R0 includes a node of nR, a contradiction.
If ( ;p; q) is a game then ( r

; p; q) is an improved game for row-player r if the
games are the same except that row-player r may have improved in the rankings of
one or more column-players:
r >c r in   implies r >c r in  r

; else   =  r

:
10 M. Baou, M. Balinski / Discrete Applied Mathematics 101 (2000) 1{12
Fig. 4. The university admissions games: (	; q); ( 	; q); ( 	
0
; q).
An assignment mechanism  is row-monotone if ( r

; p; q)>r( ;p; q) whenever
( r

; p; q) is an improved game for a row-player r [4]. Column-monotonicity is sim-
ilarly dened.
The row-optimal mechanism R is not column-monotone, as is shown by an example
of a university admissions games (where pc=1 all c, so p is not mentioned) contrived
by Jose Rafael Correa. In Fig. 4, (	; q) is the game where applicant c1 2 C is last in
the preferences of university r1 2 R; ( 	; q)= (	c1 ; q) is exactly the same game except
that c1 is rst in the preferences of r1.
The row- or university-optimal stable assignment of (	; q) is the set of black circles,
that of ( 	; q) the set of white squares. Applicant c1 when ranked last by r1 is assigned
her rst choice, when ranked rst by r1 is assigned her last choice.
Theorem 6. R is the unique row-monotone assignment mechanism.
Proof. To simplify the notation drop the p; q and let R and R be the row-optimal
stable assignments for   and a game   improved for player r.
The row-optimal mechanism is row-monotone, for suppose not. Then R0 = fr 2 R :
R >r Rg 6= ;. Theorem 5 applied to   shows R0 is a proper subset of R; so Lemma
9 shows some (r; c); r 62 R0, blocks R in  . But, then, (r; c) blocks R in   too, a
contradiction.
The mechanism R is the unique row-monotone mechanism, for suppose there were
another  that for some game   gives a dierent solution, ( ) 6= R( ), so (r)<r
R(r) for some r 2 R. Let  −r be the same as   except that row-player r is the least
preferred man of every column-player c except those for which (r; c) 2 R, whose
preferences remain the same.   is improved for r over  −r .
The assignment R is clearly stable in  −r . Moreover, if −r is any stable assignment
in  −r , then −r(r)>rR(r). To see this, suppose otherwise: −r(r)<r R(r). Then
−rC (r)<r R(r), where 
−r
C is the column-optimal assignment in  
−r , and there must
exist a node (r; c) 2 −rC with no predecessor in its column (since j−rC (r)j= jR(r)j).
But this contradicts the column-optimality of −rC .
Let ( −r) def= −r . Since −r is stable, −r(r)>rR(r). But (r)<r R(r), con-
tradicting the row-monotonicity of the mechanism .
Players may play for strategic advantage. If ( ;p; q) is the true game then ( 0; p0; q)
is an alternate game for R0R if the two games are identical except for the row-players
M. Baou, M. Balinski / Discrete Applied Mathematics 101 (2000) 1{12 11
R0 who announce altered preferences and=or altered quotas. A mechanism  is row-
strategy-proof if, when ( 0; p0; q) is an assignment in ( ;p; q), it is not true that
( 0; p0; q)>r ( ;p; q) for all r 2 R0, for any game and any alternate. Column-
strategy proofness is similarly dened.
The row-optimal mechanism R is not column-strategy-proof. For consider the game
( 	; q) in Fig. 4, where the row-optimal stable assignment is the set of white squares.
If c1 2 C changes her preferences by announcing she prefers no university to univer-
sity r1 2 R (thereby eliminating node (r1; c1)), then the new game ( 	0; q) has as its
row-optimal stable assignment the set of black circles. It pays applicant c1 to cheat:
she obtains her rst choice rather than her last choice.
Theorem 7. R is the unique row-strategy-proof assignment mechanism.
Proof. The row-optimal mechanism is row-strategy-proof, for suppose not. Then for
R the row-optimal stable assignment of some ( ;p; q), there is a stable assignment 
of an alternate game ( 0; p0; q) (that is an assignment in ( ;p; q)), with >r0 R for
r0 2 R0. Let R be the set of all row-players that prefer  to R. By Theorem 5 R 6= R,
and by Lemma 9 there exists a node (r; c); r 62 R, that blocks  in ( ;p; q). But the
preferences and quotas of r and c are exactly the same in both games, so (r; c) blocks
 in ( 0; p0; q) as well, a contradiction.
The mechanism R is the unique row-strategy-proof mechanism, for suppose there
were another  that for some game ( ;p; q) gives a dierent solution, ( ;p; q) 6=
R( ;p; q), so (r)<r R(r) for some r 2 R.
Let R0 = fr 2 R : R(r)>r (r)g and dene ( 0; p; q) to be the same as ( ;p; q)
except that every node (r; c) that precedes (r; cr) in rows r 2 R0, where cr=min(R(r)),
is excluded.
R is clearly a stable assignment in ( 0; p; q). But if 0 is any stable assignment in
( 0; p; q); j0(r)j = jR(r)j for all r 2 R and min(0(r))>rmin(R(r)) for all r 2 R0.
Thus whatever stable assignment is selected by  it yields a strict improvement for
r 2 R0, contradicting the fact that  is row-strategy-proof.
These three concordant chacterizations have practical importance for Turkish univer-
sity admissions practice [4]. In Turkey the universities are purely passive agents: by law
they must rank applicants to a same faculty on the basis of their relevant examination
scores. The only strategic agents are the applicants. These results provide a powerful
argument for using the applicant-optimal mechanism and not the university-optimal
mechanism (which is current practice).
5. Concluding remark
Comparing sets of mates is a subtle question. Here the max{min preference has been
used: a rst set of mates is preferred to a second set if the worst mate of the rst is
preferred to the worst of the second (or the worst mates are the same and the rst set
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contains more mates). This may sometimes be reasonable for universities (for example),
or it may not. In any case, it is the weakest criterion that permits the characterizations
that were given, and it is the operative comparison for stable assignments.
The characterizations do not hold when responsive preferences | the usual choice
in the literature | are invoked: when, namely, a rst set of mates is preferred to a
second set if there exists a one-to-one correspondence between them so that every mate
of the rst set is preferred or indierent to the corresponding mate of the second set.
Both criteria give to each individual agent the identical complete order over stable
assignments. The max{min criterion gives to each agent a complete order over all
assignments (where two sets of mates of the same cardinality having the same worst
mate are equally preferred), whereas the responsive criterion gives each a partial order
over all assignments.
These are mathematically accurate remarks. Are the criteria signicantly dierent in
practice? Max{min preferences permit a result concerning eciency, responsive prefer-
ences do not. Why? Because max{min preferences are less demanding. But how much
less demanding? If the number of assignments preferred to the row-optimal stable as-
signment by the responsive but not by the max{min criterion were \very small", then
it might be argued that in a practical sense there is no real dierence as concerns
eciency.
Whether the dierence between responsive and max{min preferences amounts to
more than \how-many-witches-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin?" or not, is an open, in-
teresting and seemingly dicult question.
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